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1 Abstract 
Energy security2 is one of the main targets of energy policy. However, the term 
has not been clearly defined, which makes it hard to measure and difficult to 
balance against other policy objectives. 
We review the multitude of definitions of energy security. They can be 
characterized according to the sources of risk, the scope of the impacts, and the 
severity filters in the form of the speed, size, sustention, spread, singularity and 
sureness of impacts. Using a stylized case study for three European countries, we 
illustrate how the selection of conceptual boundaries along these dimensions 
determines the outcome. This can be avoided by more clearly separating 
between security of supply and other policy objectives. This leads us to the 
definition of energy security as the continuity of energy supplies relative to 
demand. If security is defined from the perspective of private utilities, end 
consumers or public servants, the concept could further be reduced to the 
continuity of specific commodity or service supplies, or the impact of supply 
discontinuities on the continuity of the economy. 
 
                                                        
1 EPRG, Judge Business School, University of Cambridge; E-mail: c.b.winzer@gmail.com 
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2 Energy Security, the Security of Energy Supplies or more shortly Security of Supply are used as 
synonyms both in this article and in other parts of literature. 
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2 Introduction 
Security of supply is an important goal of energy policy in many countries 
around the world. The three pillars of the European Union’s energy policy are 
efficiency, sustainability and security of energy supplies (European Commission 
(EC) 2008; European Commission (EC) 2006) and a few years before his election 
as President, Barack Obama said: “We need a national commitment to energy 
security, and to emphasize that commitment, we should install a Director of Energy 
Security to oversee all of our efforts.” (Senator Barack Obama, February 28, 2006; 
Governor's Ethanol Coalition Washington, DC) 
Despite the high importance of energy security in policy, several authors have 
pointed out that the term is not clearly defined. In the words of Löschel et al. 
(2008): “The concept of ‘security of energy supply’, or in short form ‘energy 
security’, seems to be rather blurred.” This is echoed by others who claim that 
“there is no common interpretation” (Checchi, Behrens, and Egenhofer 2009) of 
energy security, or that the concept is “elusive” (Kruyt et al. 2009; Mitchell 2002), 
“slippery” or “difficult” to define (Chester). 
The confusion about energy security is also reflected in political actions. In the 
U.S. the focus of energy security has traditionally been on the reduction of 
vulnerability to political extortion, which has lead politicians to call for energy 
independence and rising shares of renewable energy. In Brazil on the other hand, 
where the vision of energy independence has already become a reality, there 
were periods when politicians advocated an increasing share of fossil fuel 
imports and decreasing shares of renewable energy to promote energy security. 
For some the goal of energy security is the protection of the poor against 
commodity price volatility. Others highlight the importance of protecting the 
economy against disruptions of energy service supplies, by allowing the prices of 
commodities to rise during periods of scarcity. For some people the goal of 
energy security is the reliable provision of fuels and the role of nuclear energy is 
one of enhancing security. For others, energy security is concerned with a 
reduction of hazards from accidents and proliferation and the expansion of the 
nuclear industry is a potential threat to energy security. 
In the absence of a clear definition, energy security has thus become an umbrella 
term for many different policy goals. “There is one thing that has not changed 
since the early 1970s. If you cannot think of a reasoned rationale for some policy 
based on standard economic reasoning then argue that the policy is necessary to 
promote ‘energy security’” (Joskow 2009). 
The aim of this paper is twofold. Firstly, we want to provide a descriptive 
overview of the conceptual landscape. Such an overview can be used in order to 
locate different studies in the wider context. This can facilitate the 
communication between authors from different fields. It can also help to ensure 
that there are no unintentional gaps in any particular analysis. And secondly, we 
want to suggest a set of conceptual boundaries that reduce the overlap between 
the policy goals of energy security, sustainability and economic efficiency. Our 
intention for these boundaries is to make sure the concept of energy security 
remains operational so that it can be measured and traded-off against the other 
policy targets.  
We will begin this paper with a literature review of explicit energy security 
definitions in section 3 and different implicit concepts in section 4 . In section 5 
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we give an overview of the big picture and summarize the dimensions along 
which the concepts can be distinguished. In section and 6 we explain 
dependencies between these dimensions. We conduct a case study focusing on 
the security of electricity supplies in section 7 to show that the choice of 
conceptual boundaries has an important impact on the results. The impact of the 
framing on results is likely to persist if other energy markets are included in the 
analysis. Based on the previous sections we finally propose conceptual 
boundaries to distinguish between the policy objectives of energy security, 
efficiency and sustainability in section 8. Section 9 describes additional 
limitations of the concept that could be caused by individual perspectives of 
private utilities, end consumers or public servants. We summarize our 
observations and draw conclusions in section 10. 
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3 Overview of Explicit Definitions 
There are several competing definitions of supply security. They all include the 
idea of avoiding sudden changes in the availability of energy relative to demand. 
However, the definitions show strong differences in the impact measure that is 
used for the benefits of increased continuity and the level of discontinuity that is 
defined as insecure. We will discuss the authors in three groups. The first group 
consist of authors who focus on the concept of commodity supply continuity. The 
second group consist of authors who introduce additional severity filters. And 
the third group consists of those authors that extend the scope of the impact 
measure beyond the continuity of commodity supplies to the continuity of 
services, the continuity of the economy and impacts on sustainability and safety. 
We summarize our findings at the end of this section. 
A first group of authors defines security as the continuity of energy commodity 
supplies. As we will see later, this concept is also central to all other definitions 
of energy security. Examples of definitions that focus on this central concept can 
be found in publications of the Department of Energy & Climate Change (2009): 
“Secure energy means that the risks of interruption to energy supply, are low” 
(Department of Energy & Climate Change (DECC) 2009). Other examples include 
(Scheepers et al. 2007; Lieb-Dóczy, Börner, and MacKerron 2003; Ölz, Sims, and 
Kirchner 2007; Wright 2005; Hoogeveen and Perlot 2007). The same concept is also 
used in technical analyses, however, with a different wording that can easily lead 
to confusion. Technical studies describe the general concept of low interruption 
risks as “reliability”. Reliability is composed of two sub-concepts: system 
adequacy, which describes the ability of the system to meet the aggregate power 
and energy requirement of consumers at all times and system security, which 
describes the ability of a system to withstand disturbances (Makarov, Member, 
and Moharari 1999; Roy Billinton and Allan 1996). By contrast to the definitions 
used in (Department of Energy & Climate Change (DECC) 2009) and in the political 
context, security in the technical context does not refer to the general concept of 
low interruption risk, but to the sub-concept of system flexibility to adapt to fast 
changes. In this article the term security refers to the broader concept which is 
similar to the concept of ‘reliability’. The common characteristic of the first group 
of definitions is the notion, that increases of the relative scarcity level of energy 
are a sign of insecurity. Whether or not price volatility is a sign of insecurity is 
disputed. In either case, a big advantage of these concepts is that they can be 
measured with established indicators of continuity such as the price volatility or 
the Loss of Load Probability (LOLP) and Expected Energy Unserved (EEU). If 
security is defined in this way it is obvious that not any level of security is 
desirable because increased stability usually comes at a price. But there are good 
frameworks for assessing the trade-off between decreasing volatility and 
increasing cost in order to determine efficient security levels (Roy Billinton and 
Allan 1996; Bagen and R. Billinton 2008). 
A second group of authors introduce subjective severity filters to distinguish 
between secure and insecure levels of continuity. The most prominent of these 
definitions is the one given by the International Energy Agency: “Energy security 
is defined in terms of the physical availability of supplies to satisfy demand at a 
given price” (International Energy Agency (IEA) 2001). The concept behind this 
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definition seems to imply, that apart from supply interruptions security is only 
impaired if the scarcity of energy leads to prices above a certain threshold, while 
the price volatility below that threshold is not relevant. The same or similar 
definitions have been used in (Vicini et al. 2005; Luciani 2004; Fondazione Eni 
Enrico Mattei (FEEM) 2008; Yergins 1988; Andrews 2005; Le Coq and Paltseva 
2009; Jun, Kim, and Chang 2008).Other examples of subjective severity filters 
can be found in definitions such as: „Security is impaired when supplies are 
reduced or interrupted in some places to an extent that causes a sudden, signiﬁcant 
and sustained increase in prevailing prices“ (Mabro 2008). In this example an 
increasing scarcity or disruption of supplies is only relevant for security if the 
speed, size and sustention of the price increases are beyond a certain level. Other 
filter criteria that have been used include the sureness of events which can be 
foreseeable (Spanjer 2007) or unexpected (Rutherford, Scharpf, and Carrington 
2007; McCarthy, Ogden, and Sperling 2007; Department of Trade and Industry 
(DTI) 2002). An advantage of this type of definition can be seen in the fact that 
the additional criteria filter out smaller discontinuities that are not important for 
the security of a country. But the use of subjective severity filters makes the 
concept of security very imprecise and difficult to measure. Continuity and price 
levels that are considered as insecure by one country could be completely 
sufficient for another country and the same is also true for different authors, 
which is illustrated by the divergence of opinions about suitable scarcity 
thresholds. 
A third group of authors extends the scope of the impact measure. Instead of 
measuring the continuity of prices and quantities on the commodity market, they 
extend the impact measure to the price and continuity of services, the impacts on 
the economy and in some cases the environment.  
An extension of the concept to the continuity of services can be found in the 
study on gas supply security by Noel and Findlater (2010): “security of gas supply 
(or gas supply security) refers to the ability of a country’s energy supply system to 
meet final contracted energy demand in the event of a gas supply disruption” (Noel 
and Findlater 2010). In their article the ‘final contracted energy demand’ refers to 
the demand for heating and cooking, and thus to energy services. This is an 
interesting alternative to commodity-focused definitions. By defining security in 
terms of service availability it introduces a weighting of potential commodity 
supply disruptions according to their impact on the continuity of energy services. 
Depending on the resilience of the ‘end consumer devices’ such as cars, heat 
pumps, light-bulbs and computers which are used to convert commodities into 
services, a disruption of commodity supplies may or may not lead to disruptions 
of service supplies. For example a computer that is connected via a UPS3 device 
will continue to provide services during short black-outs and a hybrid car with a 
dual charging unit can continue to provide transportation services even when 
the supply of one of the fuels is interrupted. Further examples defining security 
in terms of service availability can be found in (Xianguo Li 2005; Patterson 2008). 
The standard definition for the extension of the impact measure to the economy 
is the one given by Bohi et al. (1996): “Energy insecurity can be defined as the loss 
                                                        
3 Uninterrupted Power Supply (UPS) devices contain batteries that provide a near-instantaneous 
backup supply in case of power interruptions 
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of welfare that may occur as a result of a change in the price or availability of 
energy” (Bohi, Toman, and Walls 1996). The weighting of impacts by their 
monetary value is a useful way of aggregating different impact measures for 
economic decisions. Although the authors deliberately focus on a small set of 
externalities, this list could be widened if desired. Depending on the context, 
however, measures about the continuity of commodity or service supplies might 
still be needed, because they allow stakeholders to perform their own subjective 
valuation of continuity levels. Further examples for this type of definition can be 
found in (Lefèvre 2009; Grubb, Butler, and Twomey 2006; Joode et al. 2004).  
Some authors such as the Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre propose a further 
extension of the impact measure to aspects of environmental sustainability: “This 
study defines energy security as the ability of an economy to guarantee the 
availability of energy resource supply in a sustainable and timely manner with the 
energy price being at a level that will not adversely affect the economic 
performance of the economy” (Intharak et al. 2007). Similar definitions are used 
in (Kruyt et al. 2009; Verrastro and Ladislaw 2007; European Commission (EC) 2000). 
By including sustainability as a component of supply security the concept is 
significantly broadened. Although a wider concept is more inclusive it is also 
increasingly difficult to measure and might render the concept un-operational. 
To summarize, we can see that all energy security definitions include the idea of 
avoiding risks which affect the continuity of the energy commodity supply 
relative to demand. But some authors suggest different severity filters and a 
different scope of impact measures to distinguish between secure and insecure 
changes. The severity filters which have been suggested include the speed, size, 
sustention, spread, singularity and sureness of impacts. The scope of the impact 
measure that has been suggested includes the continuity of service supplies, the 
continuity of the economy and further impacts on the environment or the 
society.  While the severity filters have mostly been defined in terms of the 
impacts on commodity supply continuity, the same filters can easily be applied to 
any other impact measure. An example where a severity filter is applied to 
another impact measure can be seen in the definition by (Grubb, Butler, and 
Twomey 2006), which includes only sufficiently fast (i.e. disruptive) impacts on 
the economy: “security of supply … can be defined as a system’s ability to provide a 
ﬂow of energy to meet demand in an economy in a manner and price that does not 
disrupt the course of the economy”. As we will see later in our case study, the 
impact measure to which a filter is applied can make a big difference. For 
example some threats that can cause phase changes in the continuity of 
commodity supplies may not disrupt the continuity of services such as heating 
and transportation. 
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4 Overview of Implicit Definitions 
In many articles, security of supply is not defined explicitly. Nevertheless, based 
on the topics and indicators that are mentioned by different authors we can draw 
conclusions about the implicit definitions of supply security underlying their 
work. We find that risk sources are often analysed separately. We will group the 
discussion according to the level of separation between different risk sources. 
The first level of separation is the treatment of risk sources as separate 
categories within a composite indicator. The second level of separation is the 
usage of different indicators for each risk source. The third and strongest level of 
separation is the discussion of different risk sources in separate debates with 
conflicting vocabulary. We will discuss each of these levels of separation with 
examples below and summarize our findings at the end of this section. 
A first level of separation between human, natural and technical risk sources is 
their treatment as separate categories within a composite indicator. Examples 
for this can be seen in the distinction between different technologies (i.e. 
technical risk sources), geographical regions (i.e. natural risk sources) and 
countries (i.e. human risk sources) that underlies the widespread calculation of 
concentration measures or in the principal component analysis of simple 
indicators that represent different risk sources (Gupta 2008). 
A second level of separation between risk sources is the usage of indicators that 
address different individual risk sources. For example there are separate 
indicators for some human risk sources such as geopolitical risk and political 
instability (Net Energy Import Dependency, Political Stability Rankings), 
indicators for natural risk sources such as resource depletion (Resource 
Estimates and the Reserve/Production Ratio) and indicators for technical risk 
sources such as mechanical and thermal failure (Forced Outage Rates) and 
emissions (Non-Carbon Share). A description of these and other indicators can 
be found in (Kruyt et al. 2009). 
A third level of separation between risk sources is their analysis in completely 
separate debates. For example infrequent events such natural disasters are 
usually analyzed as topics of their own. One of the main reasons for this is 
probably that the effect on the energy supply chain represents only a small 
portion of the total impacts. But even risks with an impact closely centred on the 
energy supply chain are often discussed in separate debates. The most striking 
example of this is the isolated discussion of technical risk sources, which is not 
only treated in separate publications but also uses a different terminology 
(Makarov, Member, and Moharari 1999; Roy Billinton and Allan 1996; Wenyuan Li 
2005; Guo et al. 2009). As mentioned earlier, instead of talking about ‘energy 
security’, articles focusing on technical risk sources talk about the ‘reliability’ of 
supply. Another example can be seen in the analysis of threats arising because of 
the links between the energy infrastructure and other infrastructure systems. 
Instead of talking about ‘energy security’, these articles talk about ‘critical 
infrastructure protection’. In a similar way, although less pronounced, articles 
that focus on the measurement of different natural risk sources often talk about 
‘variability or ‘intermittency’ risk (Kooten 2009; Skea et al. 2008)or the ‘depletion’ 
of reserves. Further topics which are often treated on their own are the 
measurement of human risk sources such as strategic withholding (Holz, von 
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Hirschhausen, and Kemfert 2008; Boots and Rijkers 2000), capacity 
underinvestment (Ikonnikova 2006) and sabotage and terrorism (Salmerón and 
Baldick 2004; Baldick and Salmerón 2009). The term security itself is most 
frequently used by articles that focus on geopolitical risks. 
An overview of the risk sources that are distinguished in literature is given in the 
upper part of Figure 1. By combining the indicators for different risk sources, the 
composite indicators and other broad studies suggest that the different risk 
sources are all important for the security of supplies. The separate discussions 
on each risk are therefore still part of the same larger debate on supply security 
(Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) 2008; Joode et al. 2004; Mabro 2008; 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) 2006; Mitchell 2002). This also makes sense 
from the perspective of end consumers, because it doesn’t make a difference 
whether discontinuities of supplies are a result of human, natural or technical 
risks.  
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5 Proposed Dimensions of Supply Security 
Despite the confusion about the concept of energy security, there seems to be an 
agreement that security is concerned with risks. Some authors mention this 
explicitly (Rutherford, Scharpf, and Carrington 2007; Ölz, Sims, and Kirchner 2007; 
Wright 2005; Keppler 2007; Lieb-Dóczy, Börner, and MacKerron 2003), but as we 
have seen the idea is also implicit in the other articles on the topic. This is in line 
with the general definition of “security” according to the Oxford English 
Dictionary, which defines security as “the condition of being protected from or not 
exposed to danger”. 
In the case of energy security these threats are related to, i.e. caused by having an 
impact on the energy supply chain.  The common idea behind all the different 
definitions of energy security can thus be described as “the absence of, protection 
from or adaptability to threats that are caused by or have an impact on the energy 
supply chain”. 
It is immediately obvious that the number of threats that could be considered 
under this definition is huge (Gnansounou 2008). Studies therefore usually limit 
the analysis to a subset from the list of possible threats. These limitations are the 
main cause of conceptual differences between the authors. They differ along one 
or several of the following eight dimensions 
 
i. sources of risk 
ii. scope of the impact measure  
iii. speed of threat impacts 
iv. size of threat impacts 
v. sustention of threat impacts 
vi. spread of threat impacts 
vii. singularity of threat impacts 
viii. sureness of threats 
Dimensions i. and ii. describe the boundaries of an observation system and the 
remaining six dimensions iii. to viii. describe severity filters that are used to 
determine which threats are relevant for the analysis. The list of filter criteria is 
not exhaustive. It includes dimensions that have not been mentioned in the 
previous sections and could be extended further if required. The severity of a 
threat increases with the speed, size, sustention and spread as well as with 
decreasing singularity and sureness of the impacts. Different values along these 
dimensions are associated with different concepts of energy security.  This is 
true not only for the size of severity thresholds but also for their location, i.e. the 
impact measure to which they apply. Figure 1 gives an overview of the 
dimensions. We discuss each of the dimensions with examples below.  
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The sources of risk describe which types of risk are considered by a study. We 
can distinguish between three broad categories. Examples for supply chain 
endogenous technical risk sources are the failure of infrastructure components 
such as transmission lines, power plants or transformers due to a failure of 
interdependent infrastructure such as communication networks, or due to 
mechanical or thermal failure. Examples for human risk sources are events such 
as demand fluctuations, strategic withholding of supplies, capacity 
underinvestment, sabotage and terrorism, political instability and geopolitical 
risks like wars and export embargos. Examples for natural risk sources are events 
such as stochastic intermissions of renewable energy supplies, the depletion of 
fossil fuel stocks and natural disasters. For each of these categories further 
examples can be found and the categorisation can be re-fined. In literature 
natural and human risk sources have been pointed out as different aspects of 
supply security in (Kruyt et al. 2009; Intharak et al. 2007), where they are 
referred to as ‘availability’ and ‘accessibility’.  As discussed in the previous 
section, many studies focus on a subset of these risk sources source or at least 
don’t treat all of the risks with the same level of detail. 
The scope of the impact measure describes how energy security is measured. 
We can distinguish between four broad categories. The majority of risks that 
have an impact on the supply chain affect the continuity of the commodity 
supplies by changing the availability or the price of energy commodities such as 
oil, gas, coal or electricity. Depending on the resilience of the end-consumer 
devices to interruptions of input commodities, changes in the availability and 
price of different commodities affect the continuity of service supplies by changing 
the availability or the price of energy services such as heating, lighting, 
communication or transport. Depending on the disutility of service disruptions 
and repercussions throughout the economy, changes in the availability and price 
of energy services eventually have an impact on the economic continuity of a 
country. Apart from influencing the economy, the provision and consumption of 
energy commodities will also have an impact on human safety and environmental 
 
Figure 1: Dimensions of Energy Security. 
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sustainability, for example in the form nuclear proliferation and water pollution. 
In literature the impacts of energy supplies on welfare or the environment and 
society have been pointed out as aspects of supply security in (Kruyt et al. 2009; 
Intharak et al. 2007), where they are referred to as ‘affordability’ and 
‘acceptability’.  
The speed of threat impacts refers to the time-scale on which the impacts of 
risk materialize. We can distinguish between three different speeds. Examples 
for a constant scarcity can be seen in the renewable energy potential of a country. 
Examples for slow stresses would be the depletion of fossil fuels, the 
accumulation of greenhouse gases or growing demand. Examples for fast shocks 
would be political disruptions, technical failure or intermittency. The difference 
between shocks and stresses has been explored in (Stern 2002) where they are 
described as ‘short-term’ and ‘long-term’ impacts. Most studies focus on a single 
time scale. 
The size of threat impacts describes the magnitude of changes in scarcity within 
the affected area. We can distinguish three different levels. Threats like reduced 
reserve margins can be seen as impending changes, because they indicate the 
increased likelihood of negative impacts without having themselves a direct 
impact on consumers. Threats like price volatility or marginal rises of global 
temperature can be seen as small changes in the sense that they have an impact 
on consumers but don’t change the way the system works. And threats like 
delivery disruptions or global warming of more than 2C can be seen as phase 
changes, because in addition to having a direct impact on consumers they also 
change the way in which the system works. The importance of size as a defining 
criterion can be seen in the fact that some authors include all levels of price 
(change) within their definition (Scheepers et al. 2007; Jamasb and Pollitt 2008; 
Spanjer 2007), others include only certain levels (or changes) of price 
(Rutherford, Scharpf, and Carrington 2007; Keppler 2007; Andrews 2005; Le Coq 
and Paltseva 2009; Mabro 2008; Grubb, Butler, and Twomey 2006; Department 
of Trade and Industry (DTI) 2002; Joskow 2005) and yet others don’t include 
price risk at all but only mention interruptions (Wright 2005; Lieb-Dóczy, Börner, 
and MacKerron 2003; Noel and Findlater 2010; McCarthy, Ogden, and Sperling 
2007; Nuttall and Manz 2008). 
The sustention of threat impacts describes the duration during which the 
impacts of a threat persist. We can distinguish three different levels. Threats like 
small interruptions and short-term price volatility usually have a transitory 
impact. Both threats that occur at a slower speed and fast threats that exceed a 
certain size have a sustained impact that lasts for a considerable amount of time.  
In some cases, like the depletion of fossil fuels, the impact of threats could be 
permanent in the sense that it is impossible for the system to return to the state 
in which it was before the threat occurred. An explicit reference to the sustention 
of impacts as defining criterion can be found in (Mabro 2008). 
The spread of threat impacts describes the size of the largest geographical unit 
that is simultaneously affected. We can distinguish three different levels. Threats 
like technical component failures usually have an impact on a local level that can 
range from individual households to whole regions within a country. Disruptions 
of exports due to political risk usually simultaneously affect an import country as 
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a whole on a national level. Some environmental threats such as climate change 
or solar storms affect all countries simultaneously and therefore have impacts on 
a global level. Apart from the threat itself, the spread of threat impacts is also 
determined by the geographical size of political units (sea-level rises are a 
national threat for the Bangladesh but only a local threat for neighbouring India) 
and the existence of virtual or physical sub-markets as in the case of locational 
marginal pricing or physically disconnected parts of pipeline and transmission 
networks which reduce the spread of price risks. The spread of impacts has not 
been discussed widely in literature. However, we believe that it is an important 
dimension for determining the administrative level at which the provision of 
security should be coordinated. 
The singularity of threat impacts describes their frequency of recurrence. We 
can distinguish three different levels. Threats like fuel depletion, anthropogenic 
climate change and nuclear wars are unique in the sense that they have not been 
experienced before. Threats like political disruptions and natural catastrophes 
have happened in the past but are rather infrequent. Threats such as alterations 
of wind-speeds or many types of technical faults on the other hand are relatively 
frequent. In literature, infrequent or unique events are often analysed separately 
from more frequent events. An example for a reference that includes the 
singularity of threats as a defining criterion is the article by (Stern 2002) which 
distinguishes between ‘operational’ (i.e. frequent) and strategic (i.e. infrequent) 
risks. 
The sureness of threats describes the level of uncertainty about them. We can 
distinguish four different levels. Threats can be predicted, as in the case of fuel 
depletion, where the end of production from existing wells can be calculated 
based on assumptions about extraction rates. Threats can be probabilistic, as in 
the case of resource intermittency or technical failure, where the time of 
occurrence is usually not known but the probability can be calculated with 
reasonable precision based on past experience. Threats can be expected but so 
hard to predict, that it is debatable whether a probability of occurrence reflects 
more than a heuristic, as in the case of political disruptions or terrorist attacks. 
And finally threats can be unknown, as in the case of anthropogenic global 
warming, which was not discovered as a potential risk until its impacts started to 
be felt. More detailed characterizations of uncertainty can for instance be found 
in (Walker et al. 2003). References to the sureness of threats as defining criterion 
can be found in articles where the insecurity is limited to either unexpected 
interruptions and price increases(Rutherford, Scharpf, and Carrington 2007; 
McCarthy, Ogden, and Sperling 2007; Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) 
2002) or foreseeable events (Spanjer 2007). Apart from that an implicit 
distinction can be seen in the fact that with the exception of approaches based on 
diversity (Stirling 2007) or the precautionary principle unexpected risks are not 
included in the analysis. 
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6 Interdependencies between the Dimensions 
So far we have been treating the conceptual dimensions in isolation. However, 
there are several interdependencies, in particular between the dimensions 
describing the severity filter. Some of these dependencies will be discussed 
below. If the value along one of the dimensions was completely determined by 
the value along another dimension, it would not make sense to consider these 
dimensions as separate criteria. Rather they should be seen as different forms of 
describing the same concept. For each of the interdependencies, we therefore 
also give a counterexample, which shows, that it makes sense to distinguish the 
conceptual dimensions and treat them as separate criteria. 
Threats that are faster often cause a larger impact size because the system has 
less time to adapt. This is one of the reasons why many authors are focused on 
supply disruptions and worry less about gradual depletion. But if adaptation is 
not possible, for example because society is not able to find substitutes for 
depleting resources, a gradual stress would eventually also lead to disruptions. 
There is a tendency to be less sure about more singular threats, because there is 
less measurement data available for predictions. For example events such as 
anthropogenic climate change, which have not been experienced in the past, are 
very hard to predict. Events that occur with a high frequency, on the other hand 
are very unlikely to be completely unknown. But there are also counterexamples 
in the form of very infrequent events that can be predicted with high precision, 
such as solar storms and eclipses, and highly frequent events that are still hard to 
predict such as intermittent generation from renewable sources. 
In a similar way there is a connection between the singularity and the speed of a 
threat. Constant scarcity can either be seen as unique in the sense that it cannot 
recur because it never goes away, or as highly frequent, in the sense that it recurs 
at every step of the time-resolution. Threats which occur at a slow speed cannot 
occur with a high frequency simply because it takes too much time for them to 
repeat. But the reverse is not true as fast events can both be frequent, as in the 
case of diurnal variations of solar irradiation, and infrequent such as floods that 
can build up at a similar speed. 
And finally the geographic spread of impacts usually increases their scope. While 
the cumulated damage from commodity price increases for a small number of 
consumers will not have a tangible impact on the economic output of a country, 
simultaneous commodity price increases for all consumers can strongly 
influence the continuity of the economy. But the reverse is not true, as the scope 
of impacts can be equally wide if the smaller spread of threats is compensated by 
a larger impact size at the local level. For example blackouts that affect only parts 
of a country or catastrophic accidents with severe impacts at the regional level 
will also affect the continuity of a country’s economy as a whole. 
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7 Case Study: Result of Using Different Concepts 
Measuring the security of energy supplies from all fuels requires a very broad 
analysis. In practice, quantitative studies therefore often focus on a particular 
energy form and indicate this by talking about the security of gas, oil or 
electricity supplies instead of energy security. This reduces the data 
requirements and the complexity of the analysis. The concepts that were derived 
in the previous sections describe the security of energy supplies in general but 
can also be applied to the specific case of a single commodity. 
In this section we illustrate the practical importance of the conceptual framing 
for the results of an analysis by comparing the security of electricity supplies in 
the UK, Austria and Italy for different energy security concepts. In order to keep 
it simple, the measures that we use as representatives for the different concepts 
are very rough approximations. More detailed assessments will change the 
numerical values of individual countries, but should on average not lead to a 
convergence or divergence of the rankings across different concepts. An 
overview of the measures and the corresponding energy security concepts is 
shown in Table 1. We will discuss each of these measures in a separate 
paragraph below and present the results of using these measures at the end of 
this section. 
 
Table 1: Overview of measures used to quantify energy security and description of associated energy 
security concept along conceptual dimensions. 
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As a base case we use the historical system average interruption duration index 
(SAIDI) of electricity supplies, which is the quotient between the cumulated 
number of minutes during which individual customers were disconnected from 
electricity supplies and the number of customers in the system. The data for this 
rating can be found in the appendix 12.2.1. Historically, the majority of outages 
recorded in these indices have been due to distribution network failures. 
However, if events such as natural disasters, an export embargo of primary 
energy sources or sabotage of the energy infrastructure had led to customer 
disconnections, they would also have shown up in the SAIDI. If the SAIDI is 
calculated on the basis of all interruptions, including those caused by such 
exceptional events, it therefore represents the concept of electricity commodity 
supply continuity taking into account risks from all sources. The focus of the 
SAIDI on forced, physical disconnection implies a limitation of the concept on 
fast, phase changing events. The sustention of impacts can be either transient or 
sustained, depending on the size of the outage. The geographical spread of the 
risks that are captured by the historical SAIDI can be anything from a local to a 
global event. While forecasts of expected outage times usually neglect highly 
uncertain and infrequent events, the historical realisations we use were drawn 
from a distribution that includes all levels of impact spread, singularity and 
sureness. 
The first variation of the base-case concept consists in selecting a certain subset 
of risk sources. Instead of the historical values of the SAIDI of electricity 
including all events we now use the SAIDI excluding exceptional events. The data 
for this rating can be found in the appendix 12.2.2. Conceptually the SAIDI 
excluding exceptional events roughly corresponds to the base case but selecting 
only technical and some of the natural risk and filtering out human risk sources 
such as strikes and export embargos for fuels, sabotage and terrorism or other 
unique or highly infrequent as well as heuristic or unknown risks. 
The second variation of the base-case concept consists in extending the scope of 
the impact measure to the continuity of service supplies. We calculated the SAIDI 
of heat supply by weighting the SAIDIs for gas and electricity based on the 
assumption that all heating demand in a country that is provided by gas is 
interrupted if either electricity or gas is interrupted, because without electricity 
the gas heating controllers and warm water pumps cease to work, electricity 
based heating is only interrupted if there is no electric power and all other 
heating technologies are perfectly available due to the possibility to store the 
fuels. The data for this rating can be found in appendix 12.2.3. A more refined 
estimation would have to make more detailed distinctions between the heating 
technologies and include an assessment of household specific vulnerability to 
commodity supply disruptions. Conceptually the SAIDI of heat corresponds to 
the base case, except that the scope of the impact measure is extended to the 
continuity of heating supply.  
The third variation of the base-case concept is illustrated by extending the scope 
of the impact measure to the impact on the economy caused by discontinuities of 
commodity supplies. We use the continuity of GDP as a proxy for this concept. 
The percentage of the GDP that is lost due to electricity interruptions is 
calculated based on the customer average interruption duration index (CAIDI), 
the system average interruption frequency index (SAIFI), the sector specific 
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damage functions of industry, services and households as well as their 
contribution to the total GDP of each country. The data and calculation steps can 
be found in appendix 12.2.4. A more refined estimation would have to measure 
the interruptions experienced by each sector rather than assuming that 
interruption durations are equally spread between the different sectors and the 
hours of a year. Conceptually the GDP loss caused by interruptions corresponds 
to the base case, except that the scope of the impacts is extended to the 
continuity of the economy. 
The fourth variation of the base-case concept consists in extending the scope of 
the impact to impacts on the environment. We use the per capita CO2 emissions 
as a proxy for this concept. The data for the different countries can be found in 
appendix 12.2.5. It is clearly an incomplete representation of the concept. A more 
detailed analysis would have to represent the vast amount of other potentially 
harmful impacts on the society or the environment and aggregate them in some 
way in order to arrive at a single, cardinal measure of insecurity. Apart from the 
extension of the impact measure, the conceptual deviations from the base-case 
consist in the evaluation of gradual, but sustained or permanent changes, which 
have a global effect and are unique in the sense that they have not been 
experienced before.  
The fifth variation of the base-case concept consists in focusing on threats in the 
form of constant scarcity rather than impacts that change at a fast speed. As a 
measure for this we use the annual solar and wind energy potential of a country, 
which is limited by its land area and climatic conditions. The data for the 
different countries can be found in appendix 12.2.6. It is clearly an incomplete 
representation of the concept. A more detailed analysis would have to include all 
the other currently known energy sources. Apart from the different speed of 
impacts, the conceptual deviations from the base case consist in a focus on 
permanent and unique impacts. At least if we assume that renewable energy 
potentials don’t change, since otherwise they wouldn’t qualify as examples of 
constant scarcity.  
The sixth variation of the base-case concept consists in focusing on threats in the 
form of slow stresses rather than impacts that change at a fast speed. As a 
measure for this we used the trend of electricity prices between 2003 and 
2007.The data for this can be found in appendix 12.2.7. A more detailed analysis 
would have to include a larger dataset. Apart from the different speed of impacts, 
the conceptual deviations from the base case consist in a focus on more gradual 
changes, which due to their slow impact speed are necessarily more sustained 
and less frequent. Since some of the respective countries don’t use locational 
pricing, the threat impacts are simultaneously spread on a national level. 
The seventh variation of the base-case concept consists in focusing on fast but 
gradual changes rather than fast phase-changes. As a measure for this we used 
the volatility of half-yearly electricity prices between 2003 and 2007. The data 
for this can be found in appendix 12.2.7. A more detailed analysis would have to 
use a higher resolution. The only conceptual deviation of this measure from the 
base-case consists in the different size of threat impacts, as the price change 
implied by a disruption is usually not reflected in market prices. 
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The resulting values for the different measures of energy security are shown in 
Table 2.  The government of a country that performs less well on one of the 
scales could use this information in order to assess the need for infrastructure 
investments to improve the security of its electricity supplies to a level that is 
comparable to that in other countries. However, the results of our case study 
show that whether or not there is a need to improve the security of electricity 
supplies in a country in order to catch up with other countries largely depends 
on the impact measure and the corresponding conceptual boundaries that are 
chosen. In order to visualize this, we convert the values from Table 2 into a 
dimensionless scale and display the security levels of the UK, Italy and Austria 
relative to each other for all of the measures in the same Figure 2. In the policy 
context, the results would of course be displayed on the respective absolute 
scales. But the impact of choosing different conceptual boundaries is better 
illustrated by the relative measures, because they allow the direct comparison 
between the performance of countries on different absolute scales. For all the 
measures where a larger value indicates a higher level of insecurity, we 
calculated the relative level of insecurity by dividing the value for each country 
by the average value of all countries. For all measures where a larger value 
indicates a lower level of insecurity, the division was done in reverse order. The 
result of this calculation is shown in Figure 2. 
 
We can see that the choice of different energy security concepts has a strong 
impact on the resulting quantification of energy security levels for different 
countries relative to each other. In addition to the difference in relative security 
levels, different concepts are likely to cause simultaneous changes in the 
evaluation of the security for all of the countries, which cannot be shown in this 
Figure 2: Result of using different measures for the assessment of energy security. 
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EPRG No 1123                                                                                                                   
18 
graph. For example the exclusion of exceptional events in the first variation will 
not only change the security level of countries relative to each other but also lead 
to a lower risk level in all of the countries compared to the concept in the base 
case where these events are included. But even if we neglect these changes, the 
graph illustrates the importance of choosing the right conceptual boundaries. 
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8 Drawing the Border between Energy Security, Economic 
Efficiency and Sustainability 
From an academic perspective, an important goal is the clear conceptual 
separation of the policy objectives of energy security, economic efficiency and 
sustainability. In our view this could be achieved by three distinctions.  
The first distinction we propose is between threats that have an impact on the 
supply chain and impacts of the supply chain on the environment. The concept of 
energy security could be limited to the impacts on the continuity of commodity 
and service supplies and resulting continuity of the economy, while impacts on 
human safety and environmental sustainability are treated as separate concepts. 
Some events affect all these categories at the same time. For example a nuclear 
accident or a fire on an oil-rig have a simultaneous impact on the continuity of 
supplies, the safety of the population and environmental sustainability. For other 
events there is a time delay between the effects. For example CO2 emissions 
directly impact the sustainability of a system but have a delayed impact on the 
continuity of supplies and on human safety in the form of floods and storms 
caused by climate change. In both cases these risks are an important area of 
overlap between the concepts of energy security, sustainability and safety. It 
should be noted that the concept of safety has not been treated as a separate 
policy goal, but seems to be treated as a part of either energy security or 
sustainability. In our view safety is different from energy security, in that it 
concerns impacts of the supply chain on the environment as opposed to impacts 
of the environment on the supply chain. It is also different from the concept of 
sustainability, in that sustainability is mainly concerned with long-term goals 
including society and environment, while safety specifically focuses on fast, 
short-term impacts on the society. A more detailed discussion of the concept of 
safety is however outside the scope of this paper. 
The second distinction we propose is between the description of supply 
continuity and value judgments about the worth of different continuity levels. 
The concept of energy security could be limited to the measurement of 
commodity, service and economic continuity levels, while value judgments about 
the desirability of continuity level are addressed by the policy goal of economic 
efficiency. The pricing of continuity levels would then be an area of overlap 
between energy security and economic efficiency in the same way as the 
appropriate pricing of environmental externalities is an overlap between 
economic efficiency and sustainability.  
The third distinction we propose is between constant scarcity and changes of 
scarcity levels.  The concept of energy security could be limited to changes of 
scarcity levels, while the impact of constant scarcity levels would belong to the 
concept of economic efficiency.  On longer time-scales, any scarcity level is 
subject to change. The analysis of very slow changes in scarcity is therefore an 
area of overlap between economic efficiency and energy security. 
The resulting boundaries of the energy security concept are illustrated in Figure 
3. 
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Figure 3: Suggested conceptual boundaries of energy security. 
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9 Context Specific Boundaries of Energy Security 
In addition to the academic distinction between security, efficiency and 
sustainability further criteria can be introduced to limit the concept of energy 
security. Whether or not a certain aspect shall be included within an analysis of 
supply security is essentially a subjective decision. It will be influenced by the 
context of the analysis, the degree of risk aversion and pragmatic considerations 
about the feasibility of the measurement. Depending on the context of the 
analysis and the audience for which it analysis is conducted different conceptual 
boundaries could be relevant. 
In this paragraph we illustrate this by describing the security concept for each of 
the perspectives in Table 3. 
 
From the perspective of a private utility an important goal is to meet the 
liabilities imposed by regulations and contracts and build a reputation with 
customers. This could lead to an implicit limitation of the security concept to 
those commodities, risk sources, impact measures, spreads and sureness levels 
for which the company will be held responsible either directly, through contracts 
and regulations, or indirectly, through the impact on the reputation of the 
company.  Externalities and force majeure events caused by certain natural and 
human risk sources, which typically have a national or global impact and are less 
sure would only be relevant to the degree that they have a sufficient impact on 
the company’s revenues, reputation or liabilities. The scope of the impact 
measure would be limited to the continuity of commodity supplies. The resulting 
boundaries of the security concept are illustrated in Figure 4. 
Table 3: Different Perspectives on Energy Security. 
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From the perspective of private consumers an important goal is to protect 
themselves against the disruption of services. This could lead to a limitation of 
the security concept to the scope of impact measures and spread of the impacts 
that affect each consumer. The degree to which impacts of risks on neighbouring 
regions, or the economy and the environment are taken into account will vary 
between different consumers but usually not cover the total amount of potential 
damages. The resulting boundaries of the concept are illustrated in Figure 5. 
 
From the perspective of a public servant, in addition to the continuity of service 
supplies, it is also important to take into account the impact of service supply 
continuity on the continuity of the economy. Threats with a low severity might 
be of less concern as they provide signals to private actors. This could lead to an 
exclusion of impending and transitory impacts threats. To the extent that this is 
feasible the analysis would include threats of all sureness levels including ways 
Figure 5: Boundaries of private consumers' energy security concept. 
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Figure 4: Boundaries of a private utility's energy security concept. 
 
Se
ve
ri
ty
 F
il
te
r: III) Speed of Impacts: Constant – Slow Changes – Fast Changes
IV) Size of Impacts:Impending Change - Small Change - Phase Change
V) Sustention of Impacts:Transitory – Sustained – Permanent
VI) Spread of Impacts:  Local – National* – Global*
VII) Singularity of Impacts:  Unique - Seldom – Frequent
VIII) Sureness of Impacts: Deterministic – Stochastic –Heuristic* - Unknown*
II) Scope of the Impact Measure:
Continuity of 
Commodity 
Supply
Continuity of 
Service 
Supply
Continuity of 
the Economy
Environment 
and Society
I) Sources of Risk:
*) to the degree that these have a sufficient impact on the companie’s revenues, reputation or liabilities
Cap. Underinvestm.
Strategic Withholding
Sabotage, Terrorism
Political Instability
Geopolitical Risk
Demand Risk
Human Risk Sources*:
Resource Intermittency
Natural Disasters
Resource Depletion
Natural Risk Sources*:
Mechanical Failure
Technical Risk Sources:
Thermal Failure
Emmissions
Infrastr. Interdependency
EPRG No 1123                                                                                                                    
23 
to protect against unknown risks. The scope of the impact measure could be 
limited to the continuity of service supplies and the continuity of the economy 
while impacts on the environment would be considered under the policy goal of 
sustainability and safety. The resulting boundaries of the security concept are 
illustrated in Figure 6. 
 
Due to the relevance of different concepts depending on the context and the 
audience of an analysis, it would be more precise to indicate the scope of the 
impact measure by labelling studies as assessments of gas, electricity, oil, heat 
and transportation supply continuity etc. - if an individual fuel or service market 
is analysed- and as assessments of commodity supply continuity, service supply 
continuity and their impacts on the continuity of the economy - if a variety of 
different fuel or service markets are analysed. Limitations along the other 
dimensions should also be mentioned within the studies themselves. If the 
conceptual limitations of a study are ignored, this may lead to inefficient 
investment decisions and short-sighted regulation. A precise specification of the 
conceptual framing should thus be an important part of any analysis of energy 
security. 
Figure 6: Boundaries of a public servant’s energy security concept. 
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10 Conclusions 
Based on a review of security of supply literature, we found that the common 
concept behind all energy security definitions is the absence of, protection from 
or adaptability to threats that are caused by or have an impact on the energy 
supply chain. Due to the difficulty of measuring all these threats at the same time, 
individual authors implicitly or explicitly limit the concept of energy security 
along one or several of the following dimensions: the sources of risk, the scope of 
the impact measure, and the speed, size, sustention, spread, singularity or 
sureness of impacts. In a small case study we have shown, that the choice of 
conceptual boundaries has a large impact on the results. A description of the 
framing should thus be an explicit part of any attempt to quantify the energy 
security of a country. 
We have then proposed a set of conceptual boundaries that improve the 
distinction between the policy goals of security, sustainability and economic 
efficiency. The resulting concept, which is at the core of energy security 
concerns, should in our view best be relabelled to the less ambiguous term of 
‘energy supply continuity’. It is an umbrella term for the concepts of ‘commodity 
supply continuity’, ‘service supply continuity’ and resulting impacts on the 
‘continuity of the economy’. The additional meanings that are attached to the 
term of ‘energy security’ are largely contained in other policy goals. The 
suggested limitation would therefore not remove these concerns from the policy 
agenda but only reduce double counting and avoid the problem of securitization 
(Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde 1998). 
Depending on the audience and the context of the analysis, further limitations of 
the concept may apply. These limitations should be pointed out, since a reliance 
on a partial analysis could lead inefficient investment decisions and short-
sighted regulation. This is a topic that could be explored in further analysis. 
 
(Dunlop, Suri, and Huld 2003; Council of European Energy Regulators (CEER) 
2008; Ofgem 2009; Statistik Austria 2001; Department for Communities and 
Local Government (DCLG) 2007; LaCommare and Eto 2004; Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA) 2010; European Environmental Agency (EEA) 2009; European 
Commission Joint Research Centre (EU JRC) 2010)  
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12 Appendix 
12.1 Security of Supply Definitions 
Author (Year) Title Security of Supply Definition 
Andrews (2005) Energy Security as a 
Rationale for 
Governmental ction. 
“I use Yergin’s definition: “The objective  of  energy  security  is  to 
assure adequate, reliable supplies of energy  at  reasonable  prices  and  
in ways  that  do  not  jeopardize  major national  values  and  objectives” 
Bazilian et al. 
(2007) 
Security of Supply in 
Ireland 
„A  broad  definition  of  SOS  in  used  in  this  series  of  reports.  Based  
on  international  experience  to  date,  a  country’s energy security 
policy generally comprises measures taken to reduce the risks of supply 
disruptions below a certain tolerable level. Such measures should be 
balanced to ensure that a supply of affordable energy is available to 
meet demand. Security of energy supply thus encompasses both issues 
of quantity and price. However, time is also a key parameter,  as  a  
sudden  price  hike  will  have  very  different  effects  on  both  society  
and  the  economy  compared  to those  of  a  long-term  price  increase.  
Insecurity  in  energy  supply  originates  in  the  risks  related  to  the  
scarcity  and uneven  geographical  distribution  of  primary  fuels  and  
to  the  operational  reliability  of  energy  systems  that  ensure services 
are delivered to end users.“ 
Bohi and Toman 
(1993) 
Energy security: 
externalities and 
policies. 
"Energy insecurity can be defined as the loss of welfare that may occur 
as the result of a change in price or availability of energy" 
Checchi et al. 
(2009) 
Long-Term Energy 
Security Risks for 
Europe: A Sector-
Specific Approach. 
“The literature is divided between those who interpret energy security 
from an economic perspective and those who stress its political and 
strategic side….The  literature  is  further divided  between  those  who  
see  the  security  of  supply  as  exclusively related  to  energy and  those  
who  like  to  couple  it  with  the  environmental  dimension…. Although 
there is no common interpretation, it is possible to  identify  a  number  
of  features  that  are  always  included,  namely  physical  availability  
and prices” 
Creti and Fabra 
(2007) 
Supply security and 
short-run capacity 
markets for electricity. 
„in the short-term, supply security requires the readiness of existing 
capacity to meet the actual load; supply adequacy, instead, refers to the 
“long-run performance attributes of the system in attracting investment 
in generation, transmission, distribution, metering, and control capacity 
so as to minimize the costs of power supplies“ 
Doorman et al. 
(2006) 
Vulnerability analysis 
of the Nordic power 
system. 
„system vulnerability, which is deﬁned as the system’s inadequate 
ability to withstand and unwanted situation“ 
DTI (2002) Joint Energy Security 
of Supply Working 
Group (JESS) First 
Report. 
"Insecurity of energy supply, in the form of sudden physical shortages, 
can disrupt the economic performance and social welfare of the country 
in the event of supply interruptions and/or large, unexpected short-
term price increases. Supply interruptions to the gas system are also 
hazardous in terms of risk of gas inhalation and explosions. No energy 
form and no source of supply can offer absolute security, so improving 
security of supply means reducing the likelihood of sudden shortages 
and having contingency arrangements in place to limit the impact of any 
which do occur." 
EC(2000) Green Paper - Towards 
a European strategy 
for the security of 
energy supply. 
„strategy for energy supply security must be geared to ensuring, for the 
well-being of its citizens and the proper functioning of the economy, the 
uninterrupted physical availability of energy products on the market, at 
a price which is affordable for all consumers (private and industrial), 
while respecting environmental concerns and looking towards 
sustainable development“ 
Grubb et al. 
(2006) 
Diversity and security 
in UK electricity 
generation: The 
influence of low-
carbon objectives. 
„security of supply, for the purposes of this paper it can be deﬁned as a 
system’s ability to provide a ﬂow of energy to meet demand in an 
economy in a manner and price that does not disrupt the course of the 
economy. Symptoms of a non-secure system can include sharp energy 
price rises, reduction in quality (e.g. brown-outs), sudden supply 
interruptions and long- term  disruptions  of  supply. „ 
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Hoogeven and 
Perlot (2007) 
The EU's Policies of 
Security of Energy 
Supply Towards the 
Middle East and 
Caspian Region: Major 
Power Politics?  
„ Security of supply is a general term to indicate the access to and 
availability of energy at all times (CIEP 2004). Supply can be disrupted 
for a number of reasons, for, example, owing to physical, economic, 
social, and environmental  risks (EC 2001). The most important crises 
that have been instrumental in shaping the EU’s security of supply 
policy are of a social and economic nature and were all crises in the GME 
region“ 
Intharak, N. et al., 
Asia Pacific 
Research Centre 
(2007) 
A Quest for Energy 
Security in the 21st 
Century. 
"This study defines energy security as the ability of an economy to 
guarantee the availability of energy resource supply in a sustainable and 
timely manner with the energy price being at a level that will not 
adversely affect the economic performance of the economy. 
Following the above definition, there are 3 fundamental elements of 
energy security that will be discussed in this study: 
(1) PHYSICAL energy security, the availability and accessibility of supply 
sources; 
(2) ECONOMIC energy security, the affordability of resource acquisition 
and energy infrastructure development; and 
(3) ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY, the sustainable development 
and use of energy resources that “meets the needs of the present 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their 
own needs”. " 
Jamasb and Pollitt 
(2008) 
Security of supply and 
regulation of energy 
networks.  
„Security of supply..often discussed in terms of physical availability of 
energy sources and  their commodity price  risk“ 
Jansen, J.C., and 
Seebregts, A.J. 
(2009) 
Long-term energy 
services security: 
What is it and how can 
it be measured and 
valued?  
‘‘energy  (supply)  security’’  can  be considered  as  a  proxy  of  the  
certainty  level  at  which  the population in a deﬁned area has 
uninterrupted access to fossil fuels and fossil-fuel based energy carriers 
in the absence of undue exposure to supply-side market power over a 
period ahead of 10 years or longer.  
Joode et al. (2004) Energy Policies and 
Risks on Energy 
Markets; A cost-benefit 
analysis. 
“What is meant by ‘securing the supply of energy’? According to 
politicians, it is guaranteeing a stable supply of energy at an ‘affordable’ 
price, no matter what the circumstances…From an economic point of 
view, however, the concept of security of supply is less clear. In general 
economic terms, energy security refers to “the loss of welfare that may 
occur as the result of a change in price or availability of energy” (Bohi et 
al., 1996).” 
Joskow (2005) Supply security in 
competitive electricity 
and natural gas 
markets. 
“…what it is that I think policymakers  mean  when  they  express  
concerns  about  “supply  security”  in  liberalized electricity  and  gas  
markets.    First,  they  are  concerned  about  “involuntary  rationing”  of 
demand… Second,  policymakers  are  also  concerned  about  high  
prices,  or  at  least  sudden increases in prices… Although  perhaps  an  
oversimplification,  it  is  useful  to  group  “supply  security” concerns 
into two categories: (a) short run system operating reliability and (b) 
long run resource adequacy.“ 
Jun, Kim and 
Chang (2009) 
The analysis of 
security cost for 
different energy 
sources. 
„Energy security can be deﬁned as a reliable and uninterrupted supply 
of energy sufficient to meet the needs of the economy at the same time, 
coming at a reasonable price“ 
Keppler (2007) International Relations 
and Security of Energy 
Supply: risks to 
Continuity and 
Geopolitical Risks. 
“Traditional definitions of energy supply security combine a short-term 
notion of the continuity of physical supplies with long-terms notion of 
“affordable” prices, “competitive” prices” or “adequate prices”. The risk 
management approach to the security of energy supplies argues that 
supply security s an issue dependent  on  the  risk-adverseness  of  
consumers. Its focus is thus not the absolute level of energy prices but 
the size and impact of changes in energy prices” 
Kruyt et al. (2009) Indicators for energy 
security. 
 „...elements relating to SOS: Availability – or elements relating to 
geological existence. Accessibility – or geopolitical elements. 
Affordability – or economical elements. Acceptability – or environmental 
and societal elements.“ 
Le Coq, C., and 
Paltseva, E. (2009) 
Measuring the security 
of external energy 
supply in the 
European Union.  
"supply security, usually deﬁned as a continuous availability of energy at 
affordable prices" 
Lefèvre (2009) Measuring the energy 
security implications 
of fossil fuel resource 
concentration. 
„Energy insecurity can be deﬁned as the loss of welfare that may occur 
as a result of a change in the price or availability of energy“ 
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Lesbirel (2004) Diversification and 
Energy Security Risks: 
The Japanese Case. 
„ Energy security, like the concept of security itself is a contestable 
concept. Rather than  seeking  to  deﬁne  energy  security  
comprehensively  and  while  acknowledging different conceptions of it, 
I stress the notion of insurance against risks. An important 
aspect of energy security is the relative ability to insure against the risks 
of harmful energy  import  disruptions  in  order  to  ensure  adequate  
access  to  energy  sources to  sustain  acceptable  levels  of  social  and  
economic  welfare  and  state  power  both nationally and 
internationally“ 
Lieb-Dóczy, 
Börner and Mc 
Kerron (2003) 
Who Secures the 
Security of Supply? 
European Perspectives 
on Security, 
Competition, and 
Liability. 
„Security of supply is fundamentally about risk. More secure systems are 
those with lower risks of system interruption.“ 
Loeschel et al. 
(2008) 
Indicators of energy 
security in 
industrialised 
countries.  
our adopted general deﬁnition of energy security (no major frictions to 
the economy caused by the energy system)  
Mabro (2008) On the security of oil 
supplies, oil weapons, 
oil nationalism and all 
that. 
„Security is impaired when supplies are reduced or interrupted in some 
places to an extent that causes a sudden, signiﬁcant and sustained 
increase in prevailing prices.“ 
McCarthy (2007) Assessing reliability in 
energy supply 
systems. 
„ Security includes the dynamic response of the  system  to  unexpected  
interruptions,  and  its ability to endure them. Adequacy refers 
to the ability of the system to supply customer requirements under 
normal operating conditions“ 
Mulder, ten 
Cate&Zwart 
(2007) 
The economics of 
promoting security of 
energy supply. 
“From a political viewpoint, ensuring security of supply often means 
that a stable supply of energy needs  to  be  guaranteed  at  ‘affordable’  
prices,  regardless  of  the  circumstances. …From an economic 
viewpoint, however, the concept of security of supply is related to the 
efficiency of providing energy to consumers. …In this paper, we 
approach the issue of security of supply from the economic perspective” 
Newbery (1996) Development of 
Natural Gas Trade 
between East and 
West. 
"Security in turn requires an analysis of the possible shocks that might 
disturb the original equilibrium" 
Noel, P., and 
Findlater, S.  
(2010) 
Gas Supply Security in 
the Baltic States: A 
Qualitative 
Assessment. 
"For the purpose of this article "security of supply" (or gas supply 
security) refers to the ability of a country's energy supply system to 
meet final contracted energy demand in the event of a gas supply 
disruption." 
Nutall and Manz 
(2008) 
A new energy security 
paradigm for the 
twenty-first century. 
„Interruption of the energy supply has been identified by many as the 
primary threat that faces global energy security.“ 
Ölz,, Sims and  
Kirchner (2007) 
Contribution of 
Renewables to Energy 
Security. 
This  study  defines  energy  security  risk  as  being  the  degree  of  
probability  of  disruption  to energy  supply  occurring.  A  forthcoming  
IEA  report  on  the  interactions  between  energy security and climate 
change policy uses an analogous definition of energy insecurity as “the 
loss of economic welfare that may occur as a result of a change in the 
price and availability of energy” 
Patterson (2008) Managing Energy 
Wrong. 
“The energy security that worries politicians concerns supplies of 
imported oil and natural gas, not the secure delivery of energy services, 
such as keeping the lights on.” 
Rutherford, 
Scharpf and 
Carrington (2007) 
Linking consumer 
energy efficiency with 
security of supply. 
“In the context of this paper, we will use the term energy security to 
refer to a generally low business risk related to energy with ready 
access to a stable supply of electricity/energy at a predicable price 
without threat of disruption from major price spikes, brown-outs or 
externally imposed limits.” 
Scheepers et al. 
(2007) 
EU Standards for 
Security of Supply 
"A security of supply risk refers to a shortage in energy supply, either a 
relative shortage, i.e. a mismatch in supply and demand inducing price 
increases, or a partial or complete disruption of energy supplies. ... A 
secure energy supply implies the continuous uninterrupted availability 
of energy at the consumer's site“ 
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Spanjer (2007) Russian gas price 
reform and the EU–
Russia gas 
relationship: 
Incentives, 
consequences and 
European security of 
supply. 
„Security of supply can broadly be divided into two parts: system  
security—the  extent  to  which consumers can be guaranteed, within 
foreseeable   circumstances, of gas supply—and quantity security—
guaranteeing an adequate supply of gas now as well as in the future. 
This comprises not only gas volumes, but also price and diversiﬁcation 
of gas  supplies „ 
Stern (2002) Security of European 
Natural Gas Supplies. 
In a short paper there is limited space for a methodological definition of 
gas security.3 Perhaps the briefest way to deal with definitions is to say 
that this paper deals with the threats of supply and price disruptions 
arising from risks associated with the sources of gas supplies, the transit 
of gas supplies and the facilities through which gas is delivered. There 
are two major dimensions of these risks: 
• short-term supply availability versus long-term adequacy of 
supply and the infrastructure for delivering this supply to markets; 
• operational security of gas markets, i.e. daily and seasonal 
stresses and strains of extreme weather and other operational problems 
versus strategic security, i.e. catastrophic failure of major supply sources 
and facilities. 
Turton and 
Barreto (2006) 
Long-term security of 
energy supply and 
climate change.. 
„Security is measured as resources  to  consumption  ratio  (R:C)“ 
Vicini  et al. 
(2005) 
Security of Energy 
Supply: Comparing 
Scenarios From a 
European Perspective. 
“Energy security is defined as the availability of a regular supply of 
energy at an affordable price (IEA, 2001a). The definition has physical, 
economic, social and environmental dimensions (EC, 2000); and long 
and short term dimensions.” 
Wrigth (2005) Liberalisation and the 
security of gas supply 
in the UK. 
„security of gas supply’ : ‘‘an insurance against the risk of an 
interruption of external supplies“ (IEA 2003)“ 
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12.2 Calculation of example measures 
In this paragraph we display the data that was used for calculating the rough 
measures that represent each security of supply concept. The tables start at the 
left with the raw input data, while the columns on the right contain the security 
measure which was derived on the basis of the data. 
The last row contains the sources (for the raw data) and a short description of 
the calculation process (for the output measure, in cases where it’s not obvious). 
 
12.2.1 SAIDI of electricity: 
 
 
12.2.2 SAIDI of electricity, excl. exceptional events: 
 
 
12.2.3 SAIDI of heat: 
 
 
12.2.4 GDP loss due to electricity interruptions: 
We calculated the customer average interruption duration (CAIDI) as the 
quotient between the system average interruption duration (SAIDI) and system 
average interruption frequency (SAIFI) of each country. 
Under the assumption that the duration of interruptions follows an exponential 
distribution (with  =1/CAIDI), we calculated the percentage of interruptions 
Outi,k that have a duration k of less than 1 minute (k=k1), 1 hour (k=k2) and 
more than 1 hour (k=k3) for each of the countries i in our case study.  
 
s
 
 
Indicator
Unit [local as % Avg]
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2002-2007 2002-20072
Austria [AT] 83.08 38.44 30.33 39.41 48.49 72.00 51.96 0.53
Italy [IT] 114.74 546.08 90.53 79.86 60.55 57.89 160.77 1.64
U.K. [GB] 101.33 72.68 87.33 61.04 89.43 0.00 81.28 0.83
Source CEER (2008), p.129, Table Cos 2.5
[min/year]
 Ele.SAIDI incl. Except. Events
Calcualtion
Indicator
[min/year] [local as % Avg]
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2002-2007 2002-2007
Austria [AT] 35.23 38.44 30.33 31.35 48.07 45.50 38.15 0.62
Italy [IT] 108.88 96.88 76.52 65.74 53.84 52.47 75.72 0.77
U.K. [GB] 72.24 68.16 61.43 61.04 89.43 0.00 70.46 0.72
Source
 Ele.SAIDI no Exceptional Events
[min/occ.]
CEER (2008), p.129, Table Cos 2.1 Calcualtion
Indicator Ele SAIDI Gas SAIDI Ele Heating Gas Heating Heat SAIDI Heat SAIDI
Unit [min/year] [min/year] [% total] [% total] [min/year] [%average]
Year 2002-2007 2007 2001 2001 2007 2007
Austria [AT] 51.96 1.00 0.07 0.31 19.70 0.40
Italy [IT] 160.77
U.K. [GB] 81.28 3.51 0.09 0.86 79.57 1.60
Source CEER, 2008 Ofgem (2009) and 
Interview with E-
Control (2010)
Statistik Austria (2001) and DCLG 
(2007)
Sum of Gas and Ele SAIDI weighted by 
their share of heat supply
EPRG No 1123                                                                                                                   
35 
Based on the outage cost per customer for different outage durations in the USA 
reported in (LaCommare and Eto 2004) we calculated the loss VOLLj,k for each 
sector j that is caused by an outage of duration k in % of the yearly GDP of that 
sector. We assume that this percentage remains equal across different countries. 
For the residential sector we assumed, that the GDP equals the total GDP of the 
country (a result which was derived in (de Nooij, Koopmans, and Bijvoet 2007)). 
 
 
 
Based on the percentage of the total GDPi,j which the sectors j have in different 
countries i, we calculated the total loss of GDP for each countries under the 
assumption, that outage times are equally distributed between the sectors. 
The total GDP loss of a country i due to electricity interruptions is thus estimated 
as: 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖 = 
𝑗=𝑗1𝑗3
 
𝑘=𝑘1𝑘3
𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑖 ,𝑘 ∗ 𝑆𝐴𝐼𝐹𝐼𝑖 ∗ 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑗 ,𝑘 ∗ 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖 ,𝑗  
 
Variable Meaning 
Outi,k Share of the interruptions in country i which are assumed to have a 
duration smaller than t 
SAIFIi System average interruption frequency index for country i 
VOLLj,k Share of the yearly GDP of sector j which is lost in an interruption of 
duration up to k 
GDPi,j Share of the total GDP in country i which are provided by sector j 
 
 
12.2.5 CO2 emissions per capita: 
 
 
12.2.6 Renewable Energy Potential: 
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12.2.7 Electricity Price Trend and Price Volatility: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
